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Abstract
While concerned with how man achieves his status as a moral being, Friedrich
Schiller develops a concept of play that serves as a bridge between our sensuous
existence to the rational, realizing moral freedom. In what ways might we extend
this concept to the non-human animal? Current research by play theorists and
ethologists has shown that play behaviour in animals is both complex and crucial in
determining social patterns, and Schiller’s account may have anticipated these
observations. I argue that through Schiller’s theory of play and our current research
on animal play, it is possible to undermine the systematic removal of the animal
from the moral realm that happens in modern philosophy. Through play theory,
there is a possible way to undermine the assumption that animals are incapable of
achieving the status of moral agents, providing an alternate route to the standard
view of animals as moral patients.

Introduction
In Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, he
states “man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a
human being, and he is only fully a human being when he
plays” (Schiller 1968, 107). While concerned as to how man achieves
his status as a moral being, Schiller develops a concept of play that is
to serve as a bridge between our sensuous existence to the rational. It
is in this realm of play that we realize our moral freedom. In what
ways might we extend this concept into the realm of the non-human
animal? It has often been assumed, especially in the Eighteenth- and
Nineteenth-Century, that the mechanisms by which we achieve
morality would be exclusively human. For example, Kant argues in
Critique of Practical Reason that rational beings cannot determine
their will in a maxim based in the maxim’s content, but rather in the
form, thus excluding our sensuous existence in the phenomenal
world that is often associated with our animal bodies. If such
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determinations occur, such acts have no moral worth (Kant 2007).
Current research by play theorists and ethologists have shown that
play behaviour in animals is both very complex and very crucial in
determining social patterns, and thus Schiller’s account of moral
agency may have anticipated these current observations in biology
and psychology. In this paper, I argue that through Schiller’s theory
of play and our current research on animal play, it is possible to
undermine the systematic removal of the animal from the moral
realm that takes place in “modern” philosophical systems. First, I
discuss more in detail Schiller’s development of play as a means to
achieve morality before moving to contemporary research regarding
animal play. Then I discuss how this will be a possible way to
undermine the assumption that animals are incapable of achieving
the status of moral agents, leaving it open as to whether our current
stance on animals and morality implicitly condemns them to a lower
rank and dismisses the interests that they can generate on their own.

Schiller's Account of Play and Morality
In Schiller’s discussion of play, what emerges is that man is
unable to achieve freedom as long as he is divided between his animal
and rational nature. As the contemporary thinker Giorgio Agamben
points out in The Open, our human history has been built upon the
quest of finding the characteristic or quality that separates man from
the animal, an operation which he coins as the “Anthropological
Machine”. Through critical analysis, these “distinctively human”
qualities often dissolve into being arbitrarily identified, and only
maintain themselves by selectively ignoring problem cases. By
Schiller’s time, language was considered to be the component that
could carry out this separation (Agamben 2004), which linking to
logos, we can see connects back to our rational capabilities.
Schiller adopts this divide by identifying two seemingly opposing
drives: the sensuous drive and the formal drive. The sensuous drive
is what is derived from our physical existence, that part of us that is
aware of only the moment and represents our animal side. The
sensuous drive is considered to be passive in that it is to be open to

62

receiving matter, which is content that changes, from nature. The
formal drive “proceeds from the absolute existence of man, or from
his rational nature” (Schiller 1968, 81), where man exists as eternal
and is held together by the laws provided actively by form. At first, it
appears that these drives are diametrically opposed to each other in
that they both demand that the individual follow its directive. The
sensuous drive provides content and demands change while the
formal drive provides laws and demands consistency through rules.
Yet if one drive is stronger than the other, we arrive at a dysfunctional
individual. When the sensuous drive is stronger, man is well versed
in his material existence, but is also naïve and capricious because he
is more so momentary and blind to potentials in his perception of the
world that would direct his behaviour towards future projects. When
the formal drive is dominant, we arrive at the barbaric individual who
either is lethargic, and does not interact with his environment, or is
myopic, and attempts to force his laws upon a reality that is not
willing to conform. In that state of imbalance, man is unable to
achieve moral freedom because there is a need for the function of
both drives in order to carry out moral action. We need moral laws to
direct our will and behaviours, since the self is a product of a
coherent narrative of moments in time. Yet we also need concrete
situations in order to display that will; otherwise all appeals to a self
composed of actions will merely be an imaginary one. Thus, while
one is imbalanced between these two drives, the individual is just
driven blindly by physical impulses or remains an empty person who
never realizes itself in the material world.
It is at this point that Schiller introduces the play drive, the third
drive that operates over the first two to bring about harmony.
Although the drives appear to oppose each other, Schiller points out
that they are actually dependent upon each other to operate, since
matter needs consistency in the background in order to be
perceivable as change, while form needs content to make it
efficacious. Therefore, play brings about this harmony of the drives
by suspending their necessity to be dominant, while preserving the
necessity of their function. Both are in a sense taken seriously, as one
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tends to do in one’s own play activities, but neither is taken so
seriously that they take over the activity. It is within this realm that
beauty is realized (Schiller 1968).
The concept of aesthetic semblance is then later developed in the
Twenty-Sixth Letter in order to give more depth and detail to this
operation of play. What is characteristic of aesthetic semblance is
that we approach our phenomenal existence with a degree of
seriousness, but at the same time not so serious that we insist on a
deeper truth to that phenomenon (as the play drive approaches the
sensuous drive and formal drive). We take delight in semblance and
we remain open to what it presents, but we also are able to interact
with it based on the possibilities that particular semblance presents.
Although some may interpret this as a form of relativism or proto
phenomenology, which this paper does not need to address here
given the topic, the important aspect of this concept is that it insists
on an openness to one’s condition without demanding a radical
justification of it. Those who approach semblance by applying some
theodicy or theoretical abstraction to provide justification for the
current condition are guilty of what Schiller calls “logical semblance”,
which deviates from play and falls into deception due to its insistence
of consistency and form that does not take content and matter into
account. Such accounts of experience move away from what is
presented, and thus lose all chances of explaining reality based on the
fact that it has pushed out what is to be explained. Yet when form
and matter are approached together without a necessity of either,
play allows us to act and find meaning in that act. It is this way of
using both the sensuous and formal drives that we achieve moral
freedom, where we carry out the moral law in a concrete situation,
which in turn gives an actual meaning to the law being followed (as
opposed to a formal law that is stated but never acted upon).
The question that arises from looking at Schiller’s account of
moral agency is whether or not we could apply this theory to
animals. It could be said that Schiller is not directly interested in
whether or not animals can be moral agents. However, the sensuous
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drive gets associated with “the animal” and “nature” in his scheme,
indicating that Schiller indirectly assumes that animals lack the
formal unity that humans have. As Schiller breaks it down in the
Eleventh Letter, our experience of time as humans is quite
complicated because our experience of time is a combination of
“Person” and “Condition”, that which endures and that which
changes. Our person is what we consider to be the self, that which
links together our experiences into something that is unchanging and
is indifferent to what occurs outside of it, thus being grounded in
absolute freedom. Our condition is the circumstance that determines
who we are as a concrete individual, and even though he refers to the
condition as a monolithic category, it is actually a massive collection
of particular contents from the sensuous drive that are never actually
linked together cognitively except through the form of personhood.
Nevertheless, transcendentally, all conditions are grounded in the
larger condition of Time, the “’condition of all becoming’” (Schiller
1968, 75). This says nothing other than “the sequence is the
condition that something happens” (“die Folge ist die Bedingung,
dass etwas erfolgt” (Schiller 1968, 74: My translation from the
German), removing all necessity that is determined by the formal
drive that allows cognition and semblance. Therefore, without the
formal drive, which is the necessary component for experiencing
ourselves as free persons in time, we also lose cognition of time as a
connected sequence of events, even though there is a sequence there.
This would mean that an animal’s sense of time is only momentary,
while current research in animal behaviour proves that this is not the
case, given that they do demonstrate memory of events that have
occurred in the past.
Thus, given that Schiller attempts to open up a new realm with
aesthetics and play that negotiates between our momentary and
eternal existence, there is little argumentation that can prove that
Schiller’s system would become inconsistent or anthropomorphic if
we were to apply it to non-human animals. What I would like to take
from Schiller’s account is that play is a necessary component to how
we realize moral freedom and become moral persons, since the realm
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of play and the aesthetic is where we can negotiate between the
abstract principles that hold a person together with the constant
becoming that we are confronted with at the moment. Although
there are a number of play theorists who are not at all interested in
establishing morality through play, even in humans, Schiller is one
notable thinker who tries to establish a systematic connection
between these two concepts. If Schiller is correct in asserting that
play is how we ultimately achieve moral freedom, then the discovery
of play in animals alongside with this theory could serve to
undermine our modernist assumption that animals are incapable of
being moral agents.

Play Theory and Contemporary Animal Studies
In contemporary play theory and animal studies, theorists and
researchers have discussed three qualities of play that would, I argue,
help establish a moral order among animals, including humans: 1)
play introduces the “negative” that could be an early formation of
normative thinking, 2) it conditions the social behaviour of animals
when they reach adulthood, and 3) it is a behaviour that requires the
negotiation with others on rules to follow and what is just. We need
to explore these qualities in more detail.
In The Ambiguity of Play, Brian Sutton-Smith discusses the
theoretical background of animal play, and indicates that play does
provide a pre-linguistic form of the negative. What we mean here by
“the negative” is the awareness of something absent or lacking, thus
comparing the experience to an ideal, possibility, or other moment.
Normally, we associate the negative as a function of language because
we can indicate the absence of something or point out what we are
not doing through speech or writing. I can say, “This circle is
imperfect because not every point is the same distance from the
centre point” and mean something due to the linguistic definition we
assign to circle and the object’s deficiency to fit that expected
definition. Yet play is a specific behaviour that emphasizes what is
not being done, where the act of fighting is not really fighting or a nip
is carried out instead of a serious bite. “It says no by saying
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yes” (Sutton-Smith 2001, 22) in that the aggressiveness of certain
behaviours become suspended, allowing for the action to be practiced
itself without serious consequences that would normally follow.
As Sutton-Smith argues, this reveals a much more complex
cognitive process than psychologists and philosophers have
previously attributed to play, since negation, the awareness of
absence and what is not the case, reveals a sense of reflection in
animals that cannot be interpreted as instinctive and discontinuous.
Both temporally and cognitively, the animal is able to indicate
something that is above the experience itself, thus undermining the
assumption that animals live only a momentary existence. Given that
play itself is a very ambiguous behaviour, it does at least open up the
possibility for normative thinking, since normative thinking focuses
on what should be, yet is not always, the case. Although we often
have a difficult time explaining “normative force” or justification for
following a certain normative system, normativity itself is the
formation of expectations outside given experience, to expect
something else to occur in reality outside its description. Activities
such as play fighting indicate such forms of thinking, where a
narrative is placed over the actual set of events, no longer describing
them but rather indicating what one’s real actions are to signify in a
fictional framework.
Robert Fagen, on the other hand, uses current research in
ethology and play theory to reveal a strong correlation between play
behaviour and social behaviour in his essay “Animal Play, Games of
Angels, Biology, and Brian”. Usually, sporadic play behaviour that we
associate with child animals tends to cease in adult animals, but
Fagen argues that play behaviour still exists in adult animals through
their social bonding functions. Specifically, there are two contexts: 1)
parents still play with their children and 2) adults also tend to play
with their mates through affection. Thus, although this play
behaviour is more isolated and controlled, it still serves the function
of bringing individuals together. For example, it has been observed
that adult lowland gorillas have a similar process of selecting social
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partners as they did when they selected their play partners as
juveniles, and so one can often predict the social patterns of a group
based on their interactions as children (Fagan 1995). However, there
also seems to be a strong correlation between play and how animals
respond to stimuli: “Rats that play less are inept at judging when to
feel threatened by a situation and at judging when a situation does
not call for defensive actions. Defensive behavior of rats with little or
no play experience is seldom appropriate to the situation” (Fagan
1995, 35). Rats who did not play as much while in infancy tended to
either overreact or failed to respond to stimuli, and this translated
into how they would treat other rats when placed in the same cage.
In an extensive study conducted by Michael Potegal and Dorothy
Einon between play histories and adult rate behaviour, rats that were
socialized through organized playfighting, were less likely to engage
in shock-induced fighting than rats who were isolated during
development or socialized in pairs. Rats who were isolated and never
played with other rats tended to overreact by attacking its partner rat,
thus misidentifying the source of the shock. Rats who were socialized
through daily playfighting were also more likely to carry mice placed
in its cage, as opposed to killing it, which the latter behaviour seemed
to be less affected by the three possible conditions of rearing (Potegal
and Einon 1989). In addition, some rats that lacked a traceable play
history would develop an aggressive personality, and would bully
other rats, while others developed a more submissive personality and
would allow themselves to be bullied without much resistance (Fagen
1995). From this, we can certainly see that play does have some effect
upon our actions and our judgment of both personal and social
situations, which is a central component of moral freedom.
In “Wild Justice and Fair Play: Cooperation, Forgiveness, and
Morality in Animals”, Marc Bekoff highlights how play is an
important realm of moral development due to the necessary
construction and flexible application of rules that takes place between
animals during play behaviour. He states that: “Incorporated into
many explanations of social play are such notions as making a deal,
trusting, behaving fairly, forgiving, apologizing, and perhaps justice,
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behavioural attributes that underlie social morality and moral
agency” (Bekoff 2007, 78). In order to avoid one’s actions from being
misinterpreted as aggressive, it is necessary that animals establish
customs and rules that help signal when play is taking place. Dogs,
for example, engage in a series of bows that signal the desire to play
and, subsequently, the acceptance of the invitation to play.
Otherwise, the intention to play could degenerate into a disastrous
fight, but Bekoff points out that such confrontational developments
are rare. Animals also display a great deal of flexibility about rules, as
indicated by their ability to forgive certain breaches of rules or
miscommunications. When an animal is not necessarily well versed
in the rules of the group, more experience players will correct the
inexperience ones, while refraining from shunning them from the
game. Yet this exercise of forgiveness does not mean that the rules
are not taken seriously. Case studies have shown, such as with dogs,
that animals will ostracize continual cheaters and will not even
engage with them in play once it becomes clear that the cheater is
intentionally violating the rules of the game to “win”. Therefore,
these animals consider the game to be quite serious in the end, and
will not allow constant rule breaking to dissolve their play activities.
This idea of fairness and cooperation then stretches out beyond
the play sphere and is applied to social contexts. For example, Bekoff
points out that wolves form packs based on playmates, even though
earlier researchers thought that the formation of packs depended
more on food-related factors. Wolves who did not play with others
tend to be alone as adults and could at times be viciously attacked if
they attempted to go into a pack’s territory (Bekoff 2007). Stuart
Brown points out also that wolves neurologically become set in their
social behaviours once they develop past adolescence, and therefore
the neural plasticity present in their younger years, in which they
engage in play quite frequently, ceases. At the adult stage, wolves
become more concerned with status within the pack and the territory
of the pack, the boundaries and dynamics of which are established in
their earlier years of play. Dogs, on the other hand, often remain in
this stage of adolescence where their neural structures remain plastic,
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and therefore are more capable of learning and modifying
behaviours. A similar trend can be seen between chimpanzees and
humans, where chimpanzees cease being playful in their adult stage
and become rigid in their behaviour, whereas humans remain
physiologically in a “youthful stage” for most of their life (Brown
2009).

Moral Agents vs. Moral Patients
Some may wonder what would be the value of establishing
animals as moral agents, given that some philosophers have already
established a moral value for animals by categorizing them as moral
patients. However, I take issue with this manner of bestowing moral
worth to non-human animals. Tom Regan is one prominent
philosopher who articulates this distinction between moral agents
and moral patients. Moral agents are those who have a “variety of
sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring
impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all
considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this
determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as
they conceive it, requires” (Regan 1983, 151). Therefore, they are
much more active when considering morality, and we hold moral
agents responsible for their actions because we see them as directing
their own behaviour. More specifically, we see moral agents as
possessing some quality that makes them capable of engaging with
moral systems. We also acknowledge them as equals, and there is a
demand of reciprocity that goes along with the respect amongst
moral agents. Moral patients, on the other hand, “lack the
prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behaviour
in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they
do” (Regan 1983, 152). Animals are often classified as moral patients,
and thus cannot have their actions be evaluated in terms of being
morally wrong or right, yet we still say that they deserve to be morally
considered when we act towards them.
Although one can appreciate Regan’s attempt to incorporate
animals into the moral realm, this concept of moral patient

70

establishes an extremely passive role, and it reveals the modern bias
that relegates animals to the sensuous realm. In designating them as
moral patients, we imply that they are incapable of engaging in any
moral system whatsoever, and their interests thus become visible
only through our own moral system. Animals are seen as not
directing their own behaviour, yet the research above does show that
they are in fact capable of regulating their own actions and social
interactions (and perhaps better than humans, given some case
studies). In The Case for Animals Rights, Regan tries to take the
animal’s interest into consideration based on the principle that
interest is the very thing that directs our behaviours, yet it seems
problematic if we were to take an animal’s interest seriously but not
its actions. Thus, the danger of Regan’s system, as well as any other
who classify non-human animals as moral patients, is that they
become highly anthropocentric. The value that we can derive for
animals do not really generate from their own interests, even though
we may be able to recognize them as having such, but rather their
value is generated through the structure and content of our own
moral system. This completely ignores the fact that animals do
construct their own social behaviours based on their own norms
rather than ours, which their play behaviour demonstrates. If we fail
to acknowledge these moral systems that are constructed, and thus
fail to see animals as moral agents within their own horizon of
interests, we will never be able to really take into account the animal
in any real moral light. In failing to embrace the alterity of the non
human animals on its own terms, we fail to establish any substantial
moral worth them.

Conclusions
Although these points derived from current research on animals
does not conclusively show us that animals do have a specific moral
system, or even how we can interact with that moral system to see
them as moral agents, it does open up questions that undermine the
early modern assumption that it is simply out of the question that
animals could be moral agents. As Schiller’s account suggests, if we
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realize our status as moral agents through play, then the observation
that other animals play points to the possibility that moral agency is
not an exclusively human way of living. In fact, as we begin to take
non-human animals more seriously, we see unfolding a complex
structure of social and personal relationships that are not ruled by
instinct. As Fagen points out in his essay, evolutionary biologists
have started researching how aesthetics may have contributed to the
biodiversity we see today, and they suddenly have made great
progress in explaining certain puzzling parts of Darwin’s theory of
evolution (Fagen 1995). Thus, with further research, we may find out
that seeing animals as moral agents is not so ridiculous after all, and
it is in fact incredulous to think that non-human animal behaviour
should lack the coherency that we see behind our actions.
Establishing animals as moral agents, entities that can establish and
govern themselves by rules, both calls into question how we
categorize animals and where we place ourselves in relation to the
“moral realm”. If we are to interact seriously with animals, we need
to cease placing ourselves in completely different realms of existence,
and acknowledge that both man and the animal exist somewhere
between the moment and the eternal.
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